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Abstract 
 
The eminent French biologist and historian of biology, François Jacob, once notoriously 
declared ―On n‘interroge plus la vie dans les laboratoires‖1: laboratory research no 
longer inquires into the notion of ‗Life‘. Nowadays, as David Hull puts it, ―both 
scientists and philosophers take ontological reduction for granted… Organisms are 
‗nothing but‘ atoms, and that is that.‖2 In the mid-twentieth century, from the immediate 
post-war period to the late 1960s, French philosophers of science such as Georges 
Canguilhem, Raymond Ruyer and Gilbert Simondon returned to Jacob‘s statement with 
an odd kind of pathos: they were determined to reverse course. Not by imposing a 
different kind of research program in laboratories, but by an unusual combination of 
historical and philosophical inquiry into the foundations of the life sciences (particularly 
medicine, physiology and the cluster of activities that were termed ‗biology‘ in the early 
1800s). Even in as straightforwardly scholarly a work as La formation du concept de 
réflexe aux XVII
e
 et XVIII
e
 siècles (1955), Canguilhem speaks oddly of ―defending 
vitalist biology,‖ and declares that Life cannot be grasped by logic (or at least, ―la vie 
déconcerte la logique‖). Was all this historical and philosophical work merely a 
reassertion of ‗mysterian‘, magical vitalism? In order to answer this question we need to 
achieve some perspective on Canguilhem‘s ‗vitalism‘, notably with respect to its 
philosophical influences such as Kurt Goldstein. 
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Tout ce que j‘ai écrit était vitaliste, du moins je l‘espère . . . 
(Gilles Deleuze)
3
 
 
 
 
French biophilosophy
4
 in the 1950s-1960s means at least three names – Georges 
Canguilhem, Raymond Ruyer, and Gilbert Simondon – along with someone who presented 
himself strictly as a scholar, a historian of science, but who, as it turns out, can also be 
considered as belonging to this group: Jacques Roger (Ruyer‘s early works are 
contemporary with Canguilhem‘s, in the 1940s; Simondon and Roger are active in the 
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1960s and, in Roger‘s case, until the 1990s). A full-scale comparative study of these figures 
would demonstrate, among other things, how they combined the history of science with 
philosophy to move the ‗life sciences‘ to center stage, and how this ‗biophilosophy‘ 
differed from what we now know as the philosophy of biology.
5
 The present essay will 
restrict itself to the figure of Canguilhem. 
I first heard of, and started using, Canguilhem as a scholar – as an authority on the 
history of the life sciences and their conceptual underpinnings, in modern thought. 
Actually, that is not quite correct. I first heard of Canguilhem as a theorist, someone who 
had been Michel Foucault‘s teacher. And I tried to read The Normal and the Pathological 
and found it less exciting and rewarding than I expected, or than Foucault said. At a later 
point, having read a lot of Nietzsche like many philosophy undergraduates, it started to 
make more sense to me why Foucault could say, in the preface to this work but especially 
in an interview, that Canguilhem was a Nietzschean, much to the puzzlement of the poor 
journalist interviewing him. Some years later, doing graduate work on early modern 
philosophy and the life sciences and trying to understand the tensions between mechanistic 
and organismic models of life in this period, a period in which even pure metaphysics can 
lead straight away to the life sciences and specifically to the most anti-mechanistic, 
enthusiastically epigenetic, parts of the life sciences,
6
 Canguilhem reemerged in my 
readings, as a major ‗authority‘, albeit one who happily quoted Aristotle, Kant and Hegel 
(not Nietzsche) in the midst of an analysis of Claude Bernard, Charles Darwin, Georg-
Ernest Stahl, or Thomas Willis. I was surprised to hear, then, recently from a friend and 
mentor who had been involved in a workshop on Canguilhem that year at the Max-Planck 
Institute for the History of Science in Berlin,
7
 that Canguilhem was ―filled with mistakes,‖ 
or at least exaggerations and non-textually supported claims. In other words, what you 
would expect of a philosopher! But that‘s all right: we read Hegel on Aristotle, Russell on 
Leibniz, or Jonathan Bennett on Spinoza despite all their mistakes or perhaps even because 
of them. That much established, what will be my goal here? 
If we look at Canguilhem‘s unusual status as a thinker, along with some other 
contemporaries of his in France in the post-war decades, Roger, Ruyer and Simondon, we 
notice a shared focus on vitalism. More specifically, we notice that these thinkers blend the 
historical and the normative when dealing with vitalistic themes in the conceptual 
foundations of the life sciences (namely, the as-yet-unnamed ‗biology‘, natural history, 
medicine, physiology, etc.). This appears quite bluntly in Canguilhem, who presents 
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himself at least to all but close readers as a scholar, with a thèse d’État on the origins of 
reflex physiology – yet declares quite bluntly that he is a vitalist. 
I am not the first person to note that there is an unusual combination of the historical 
and the normative, or the scholarly and the speculative, in these thinkers. In a little-known 
but interesting book entitled La notion d’organisation dans l’histoire de la biologie (1978), 
a book which is marred by frequent polemical outbursts (which, however, also contribute to 
rendering it interesting), Joseph Schiller targeted Jacques Roger, Foucault, and Canguilhem 
as anti-Cartesians who attempt to revise the history of science in a ‗vitalistic‘ way so as to 
deemphasize the key role of Descartes in particular and the mechanistic ‗paradigm‘ in 
general. Schiller opposes ‗good‘ history of science, which he understands as being in 
agreement with what the scientists say, and thereby has to be mechanistic, from Descartes 
to Bernard and beyond, to ‗bad‘ history of science, which obeys certain philosophical 
imperatives, in this case vitalistic ones. We are more familiar with authors in science 
studies opposing ‗hard‘ mechanistic science to relativistic socio-cultural discourses; here 
the opposition is between mechanism and vitalism. 
As it turns out, Canguilhem quite explicitly reflects on the dual nature of vitalism as 
both a historical object and a conceptual stance, thus mirroring Schiller‘s critique, but also 
becoming a moving – because self-aware – target. Thus my main focus in what follows will 
be this dual nature of vitalism, as presented ‗by‘ Canguilhem but also ‗in‘ Canguilhem, that 
is, both according to his analyses and according to his own performance as a philosopher. 
Hopefully this will both shed some light on a particular intellectual constellation in postwar 
France and disturb some of the philosophical complacency on the topic of vitalism which is 
characteristic both of Anglophone philosophy (which views it as something negative) and 
German philosophy (which views it as something positive).
8
 
 
 1. 
 Canguilhem often refers to vitalism in his work, going as far as describing himself 
as one in the Foreword to his book on the development of the notion of reflex: ―Il nous 
importe peu d‘être ou tenu pour vitaliste…‖ and presenting the book itself as a ―defense of 
vitalist biology.‖9 But some years earlier, he had devoted one article exclusively to the 
topic, ―Aspects du vitalisme‖ (originally a series of lectures given at the Collège 
Philosophique in Paris in 1946-1947).
10
 In this piece, Canguilhem asserts from the outset 
that when the philosopher inquires into biological life, she has little to expect or gain from 
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―a biology fascinated by the prestige of the physicochemical sciences, reduced to the role of 
a satellite of these sciences‖ (p. 83). In other words, the philosopher in this position is 
almost inexorably led to a vitalist positionnement. The type of questions she will have for 
biological science entails that the latter not be conceived of in reductionist terms, although 
Canguilhem doesn‘t explicitly say if a purely physicochemical perspective on biological 
entities is flawed ontologically, or just methodologically. Nevertheless, this is a loaded, 
rather a prioristic conception of biological science, actually quite reminiscent of the holism 
of Kurt Goldstein, who Canguilhem openly credits as a major influence. I shall say a bit 
more about Canguilhem and Goldstein later on (surprisingly few scholars have addressed 
their relation),
11
 but for now just want to emphasize his unusual way of presenting the 
relationship of philosophy to biology (after all, sixty years later, with the emergence of a 
major sub-discipline called ‗philosophy of biology‘, as presented notably in the journal 
Biology and Philosophy, we might say that nothing at all has to make the philosopher adopt 
this position with regard to biology!). 
 Even if he is wearing the hat of the historian of medicine, looking at the 
construction of a concept (say, the cell theory), Canguilhem the philosopher asks highly 
‗motivated‘ questions of science, in a manner which probably owes a great deal to 
Bachelard‘s historical epistemology: ―A philosophy which looks to science for the 
clarification of concepts cannot disregard the construction of science‖; ―Truth is not 
constituted in a history of truth but in a history of science, in the experience of science‖; 
―the pursuit of truth is the effect of a choice which does not exclude its opposite.‖12 The 
history of science has to study possible conceptual developments rather than just invalidate 
the past (the error of ‗presentism‘). What this entails for vitalism is that it has a specifically 
philosophical place, whether it is scientifically ‗validated‘ or ‗refuted‘, and apart from its 
status as a scientific ‗construction‘. 
In this sense, as Canguilhem suggests, vitalism is not like geocentrism or 
phlogiston: it is not refutable in quite the same way.
13
 It‘s clear that Canguilhem does not 
agree with Francis Crick‘s rather confident pronouncement, sounding very much like 
someone who feels he has the whole scientific community behind him: ―To those of you 
who may be vitalists, I would make this prophecy: what everyone believed yesterday, and 
you believe today, only cranks will believe tomorrow.‖14 Canguilhem‘s response to this 
would be that if vitalism is a permanent bugbear for mainstream mechanistic science, then 
it has a somewhat ‗undead‘ character. And this is fair enough, if we consider the two major 
 5 
refutations of vitalism – the two moments at which an actual case is built against it, rather 
than hand-waving and or dismissing it as being in bad taste. 
Vitalism is generally considered to have been ‗refuted‘ twice. First, according to a 
celebrated scientific tale, with Friedrich Wöhler‘s synthesis of urea in 1828, which showed 
that organic substances can be produced out of inorganic compounds, thus rendering the 
claim that the chemistry of the living body is categorically distinct from that of inanimate 
bodies, invalid. Second, a century later, this time because of physics, in early twentieth-
century Vienna Circle arguments against Hans Driesch and Bergson, in the name of the 
causal closure of the space-time world.
15
 The undead character of vitalism shows up in the 
first case, with Wöhler‘s synthesis of urea, when people start to describe the purported 
refutation as a ―chemical legend‖ (including because the synthesis was actually only 
performed by Berthelot later on), and when chemists like Berzelius continue to speak of 
vital forces afterwards
16
; in the second case, substantival vitalism is refuted, not what we 
might call explanatory or heuristic vitalism. 
So not only is vitalism a unique kind of historical object; much more 
metaphysically, it is Life itself which dictates a certain kind of attitude on the part of the 
inquirer. There is something about Life that places the knower in a special relation to it. 
Indeed Canguilhem frequently makes an overtly metaphysical, ahistorical claim that the 
living animal is necessarily a knower, so that conversely, the nature of Life itself forces the 
knower to approach it in a certain way (the echoes of the first sentence of Aristotle‘s 
Metaphysics, ―All men by nature desire to know,‖ are probably deliberate here). One of 
Canguilhem‘s most difficult and ambitious pieces, one of the few places where he 
deliberately indulges in high metaphysics, the 1966 essay ―Le concept et la vie,‖ begins 
with a long meditation on Aristotle, and declares that the thinker is interested in Life insofar 
as it is ―the form and potential of the living.‖17 Or, at the beginning of the reflex book, a 
comment which recalls Hegel‘s Science of Logic: ―Life disconcerts logic‖ (―la vie 
déconcerte la logique,‖ p. 1)! Foucault repeats much the same thing in his fine essay on 
Canguilhem: ―To form concepts is a way of living, not of killing life.‖18 
 This means that science itself is derivative of a more fundamental ‗vital‘ activity. 
Mechanism and vitalism are two poles between which our thinking oscillates, in relation to 
an object called Life which transcends this opposition. Indeed, in ―Aspects du vitalisme‖ 
we find explicit binary oppositions, e.g., ―Mechanism and Vitalism are at odds on the issue 
of structures and functions‖ (p. 85); but Life itself is said to transcend these oppositions: 
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―The opposition between Mechanism and Vitalism, or Preformationism and Epigenesis, is 
transcended by life itself, extending itself [se prolongeant] as a theory of life‖ (ibid.). Of 
course, if vitalism and mechanism are simply the two poles of the activity of Life and its 
interpretation (son intelligence, one would say in French), why should vitalism be any 
better than mechanism? (In his acute, short analysis of ―Canguilhem and the autonomy of 
biology,‖19 Stephen Gaukroger targets precisely this kind of opposition for getting in the 
way of genuine history of science.
20
) I will not attempt to answer this question now, as I 
mainly want to emphasize that Canguilhem is operating with an extremely robust, one 
might even say overdetermined concept of Life. 
The idea that vitalism is a fundamental existential attitude rather than simply a 
scientific theory is very Goldsteinian. That is, Canguilhem takes over Goldstein‘s chief 
holistic or organismic idea – it is the organism as a totality, not a cluster of functions or 
organs, that acts and reacts, as a unified approach to its environment and its challenges21 – 
and strips it of some of its more overtly metaphysical trappings; yet the holistic dimension, 
the emphasis on the ‗whole person‘, reappears now and then, with surprisingly existentialist 
and humanist overtones, when Canguilhem opposes Life to technology and the various 
forms of the ―mechanization of life,‖ and speaks of human biology and medicine as 
belonging to an ―anthropology‖; by extension, ―medical vitalism‖ is the expression of an 
―instinctive suspicion toward the power of technology over life.‖22 That Canguilhem, who 
was admired and described as an ―incalculable influence‖ by Althusser,23 not to mention 
Foucault, was also a humanist (in a Comtean vein, mediated by Alain), is yet another facet 
of this Sphinx-like intellectual. 
Canguilhem strips the Goldsteinian concept of organism of some of its metaphysical 
trappings in at least two ways: a more ‗Darwinian‘ way, which, while preserving an 
existential emphasis on vitality, is less totality-oriented, as Jean Gayon helpfully notes, and 
more directed towards the challenges of the environment; a more ‗Nietzschean‘ way, which 
emphasizes a kind of blind vitality without teleology. The latter dimension provides more 
of a link to Foucault, who somehow manages to connect contextualist history of science to 
Nietzschean anti-foundationalism (concepts and the activity of concept formation are not 
foundational but are rather derivative from something more fundamental, Life itself). Yet 
we should notice a significant difference between Canguilhem and Foucault, if not at the 
‗basement level‘ of their Nietzscheanism, then at least on the specific topic of the status of 
biological entities and theorizing. Namely, as is well known, Foucault declared – 
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controversially – in Les mots et les choses that ‗Life‘ did not exist before the emergence of 
biology as a science bearing that name, in the nineteenth century.
24
 In contrast, 
Canguilhem, despite being a discontinuist in the history of science, holds that something 
called ‗Life‘ determines the emergence of various theoretical enterprises, and exerts a kind 
of traction on the knower / theorist / scientist.
25
 
 We can summarize Canguilhem’s views as presented so far, as two major claims: 
— conceptual clusters such as Mechanism or Vitalism, doctrines such as preformation 
or epigenesis are themselves just aspects of something more fundamental, Life 
itself, and its ramifications which we can term ‗theories of Life‘; 
— vitalism (like mechanism) is something like a fundamental existential attitude. 
The second claim is a fair candidate for being Canguilhem‘s ‗big claim‘ as a philosopher; 
the first claim, despite its metaphysical character, is intimately bound up with his project as 
a historian of science or épistémologue. I would like to flesh this out briefly, using as my 
main example Canguilhem‘s thèse d’État, La formation du concept de réflexe aux XVIIe  et 
XVIII
e
  siècles, before returning to the properly philosophical claim about vitalism, which is 
my chief focus here, since the purpose of this essay is not to evaluate Canguilhem‘s 
historical claims at length. 
 
 2. 
 What does Canguilhem‘s La formation du concept de réflexe tell us about his 
practice as a historian? First, that his vision of the history of science, its discontinuities, and 
its way of privileging the life sciences over the traditionally predominant mathematizable 
sciences, is very much a conflict model. Notably, the argument of this book is that Willis 
rather than Descartes deserves to be considered, not just the founder of physiological 
inquiry into this problem, but as a kind of ‗father‘ of modern physiology, particularly 
neurophysiology (to get a sense of what Canguilhem was reacting against, consider, 
amongst many similar statements, this one from J.H. Woodger: ―Descartes‘ physiology of the 
nervous system has served as the foundation for all that has since been done in the interpretation of 
that system, and the modern view has in principle departed but little from the lead that Descartes 
gave it‖26). Just as in the paper on vitalism, in which he spoke of vitalism as the true source 
of reflex theory, rather than mechanism, he is stating an explicit opposition: it‘s a clear case 
of history of science understood as a series of either/ors. The same opposition appears in a 
later essay on the notion of ‗environment‘ in biological thought, in which Canguilhem 
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opposes the restrictive, Cartesian view of animal motion, this time as presented in 
behaviorism, to a richer understanding of motion and perception presented in Gestalt theory 
and von Uexküll‘s ethology.27 
 Canguilhem deliberately takes the opposite stand from the mainstream scientific 
view, stated notably by Pavlov (and then Sherrington), that in the emergence of scientific 
study of reflex phenomena, ―In the main we base ourselves on Descartes‘ concept of the 
reflex. Of course this is a genuinely scientific concept, since the phenomenon implied by it 
can be strictly determined.‖28 In nineteenth-century physiology and subsequently, reflex 
phenomena were considered in fully mechanistic fashion to be basic components of animal 
motion. But in Canguilhem‘s view, Sherrington‘s insistence on treating the reflex as an 
elementary form of the integrative power of the nervous system is a step back in the right 
direction taken by Willis (and Robert Whytt) – vitalism!29 This is because the problem of 
how to explain animal motion tends to be overshadowed by the explanation of muscular 
motion, while it in fact involves nervous activity as well. 
 His revisionist claim, then, is that we have misinterpreted the history of this area of 
science, and misjudged its actors, because we are ‗blinded‘ by the prejudice that successful 
science is mechanistic science. Now, in strictly historical terms it is possible to challenge 
Canguilhem‘s revisionist view, or at least temper it, by showing that he gets Descartes 
wrong, either because Descartes does actually have more of a sophisticated reflex theory 
than Canguilhem claims, or because Canguilhem gets the Cartesian project wrong. 
 Objections of the former sort are raised, e.g. by Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, who quotes 
passages from Descartes that Canguilhem does not mention, describing Pavlovian 
conditioning of a dog who is whipped while a violin is playing, and gradually acquires the 
reflex of fleeing at the sound of a violin.
30
 Broader interpretive objections include those of 
Stephen Gaukroger, who observes that Cartesian mechanistic physiology doesn‘t have to be 
seen as denying or disinterested in the existence of goal-directed processes (it is in fact 
replete with functional language, e.g. when discussing the circulation of blood and the 
motion of heart in the Discourse on Method). Descartes‘ physiology just runs up against 
some walls when it comes to generation – so that he rejects any teleological explanations in 
fœtal development. It‘s more of a reductionist program than an eliminativist program: 
―Descartes‘ point is not that bodies actually are machines (an eliminativist view) but rather 
that the structure and behaviour of bodies are to be explained in the same way that we 
explain the structure and behaviour of machines (a reductionist view).‖31 This is meant to 
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counter Canguilhem, who in Gaukroger‘s view interprets Descartes as an (unsuccessful) 
eliminativist. The revival of vitalism in nineteenth-century biology arose, in Gaukroger‘s 
view, less in response to the ‗problem of life‘ (which corresponds to the more ‗Aristotelian‘ 
thrust in Canguilhem, as I‘ve termed it: that which stresses the relation between the knower 
and Life itself) than because of the issue of goal-directed processes. 
 But recall that vitalism is not just a historical episode here. In Canguilhem‘s eyes, as 
we have seen, it is also a fundamental existential attitude:  
Vitalism expresses a permanent requirement or demand [exigence] of life in living 
beings, the self-identity of life which is immanent in living beings. This explains 
why mechanistic biologists and rationalist philosophers criticize vitalism for being 
nebulous and vague. It is normal, if vitalism is primarily a ‗demand‘, that it is 
difficult to formulate it in a series of determinations.
32
 
 
 3. 
Vitalism expresses a permanent ―requirement‖ or ―demand‖ of life as present in living 
beings; the self-identity of Life immanent within living beings. What exactly is this 
―requirement‖? Something teleological? Purposive? Foucault, seeking to give a charitable 
interpretation of the place of vitalism in Canguilhem‘s thought as what we might call a 
heuristic concept, quotes another passage from this article in which Canguilhem uses the 
word exigence again (he uses it 7 times in all): vitalism is ―more a requirement than a 
method, an ethics rather than a theory.‖33 Now, it may be a requirement rather than a 
theory, but it is, I suggest, a big requirement: that Life itself, symmetrically to the inquirer‘s 
attitude, is understood as self-positing, spontaneous activity: 
It is certain that the vitalists view generation as the basic biological phenomenon, 
for the images it generates and the problems it raises impact all other biological 
phenomena. A vitalist, I would suggest, is someone who is led to reflect on the 
nature of life more because of the contemplation of an egg than because of s/he has 
handled a hoist or a bellows.
34
  
 
Notice how the above passage moves imperceptibly from the historical (a description of 
―the vitalists‖) to the assertive (―a vitalist is…‖), and even, as we see in the following 
passages, to the prescriptive: 
An organism is an entirely exceptional mode of being, because there is no real 
difference, properly speaking, between its existence and the rule or norm of its 
existence. From the time an organism exists, is alive, that organism is ‗possible‘, 
i.e., it fulfills the ideal of an organism; the norm or rule of its being [existence] is 
given by its existence itself.
35
 
 
Or: 
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Man is only truly healthy when he is capable of multiple norms, when he is more 
than normal. The measure of health is a certain capacity to overcome organic crises 
in order to establish a new physiological order, different from the initial order. In all 
seriousness, health is the ability [le luxe] to fall ill and then get over it. On the 
contrary, illness is the reduction of the power to overcome other illnesses. 
36
 
 
So the philosopher of biology has to understand Life in a certain way in order not to miss 
its essential spontaneity; historically, thinkers known as vitalists have had what he calls 
―this vitalist confidence in the spontaneity of life.‖37 But the strongest claim of all is that 
Life itself is a positing of norms. The recurring Nietzschean point in Canguilhem‘s writing, 
that what it is to be alive rather than a crystal or mineral is to be capable of error, or 
conversely, that life could be the result of an error,
38
 must be understood in support of his 
more general claim that norms are derived from vital activity itself. A vital error is 
something like an anomaly, which is why the history of biological thought always includes 
the problem of monsters: ―If life has any meaning, we have to admit the possibility of a loss 
of meaning, of aberrations and boss shots or misdeals [maldonne].‖39 Hence, as 
Canguilhem often says, there are no monstrous crystals, nor monstrous machines. Earlier I 
distinguished between Darwinian and Nietzschean aspects of Canguilhem‘s vitalism, but 
here they merge, with the anti-foundationalist, anti-teleological claim that Life is both 
capable of error and possibly derived from an error – a claim which may be seen as 
mitigating his vitalism. 
 Nevertheless, Canguilhem is a vitalist, both as a philosopher and as a historian. 
Granted, he does not appear to be a substantival vitalist (a theorist of extra-causal vital 
forces), nor does he believe that higher sentient mammals constitute an ‗empire within an 
empire‘, as we shall see below. The latter position makes him something like a naturalist. 
Yet the odd metaphysics that is inseparable from his position makes his contribution very 
different from a straightforward ‗patient-centred‘ philosophy of medicine.40 This 
metaphysics is both a kind of strong vitalism with Aristotelian and Hegelian resonances, 
and what I termed a kind of existentialism – and both of these make Canguilhem a very 
different thinker from what Foucault presents him as, in his homage, ―La vie: l‘expérience 
et la science.‖ Namely, instead of being the pure of heart anti-phenomenologist, the 
Résistance fighter who fought without a grounding concept of a subject, self or ego, 
Canguilhem is very much a Goldsteinian, like Merleau-Ponty: someone who loads the 
concept of organism, or living beings, with enough determinations to radically distinguish 
them from the rest of the natural world.
41
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 To summarize these two dimensions of Canguilhem‘s thought, one could say that on 
the one hand his vitalism is heuristic, a claim that living phenomena need to be approached 
in a certain way in order to be understood; but on the other hand, it possesses a more 
ontological, Aristotelian dimension. One of Canguilhem‘s students, Dominique Lecourt, 
confuses this heuristic dimension with ontological vitalism: ―The assertion of . . . ‗vitalism‘ 
as an intellectual requirement which aims to acknowledge the originality of Life, entirely 
retains its significance today, when the combination of a type of biochemical materialism 
and a type of mathematical formalism tend to deny this originality of Life, the better to 
neuronalize thought.‖42 In contrast, in his earlier work on epistemology,43 Lecourt had 
judged Canguilhem‘s vitalist tendencies severely – they were the part of his thought that the 
Marxist interpreter should not keep. 
 Consider the example Canguilhem had given in ―Aspects du vitalisme‖: vitalism is 
not like (the theory of) phlogiston or geocentrism. Now, faced with this ‗fact‘ that vitalism 
is not like phlogiston, there are two possible responses: 
— it‘s not like phlogiston because it‘s true and thus one‘s ontology needs to include it; 
— it‘s not like phlogiston because it has this heuristic value, or explanatory power. 
In fact, it‘s not entirely clear where Canguilhem falls in this divide. However, his comments 
on vitalism as an ―orientation‖ (what I have called an attitude) tend towards the latter 
interpretation. Indeed, it is clear that both philosophically and as a historian of science (to 
reintroduce this naïve distinction) he is careful to distinguish his claims from the more 
inflated ones of substantival vitalism. (Notice that if vitalism is a refutable scientific theory, 
then it should have to meet the basic Popperian requirement that a scientific theory has to 
be refutable – granting the pertinence of this vision of science, of course. When 
Canguilhem says vitalism isn‘t like geocentrism or phlogiston then how can it be a 
scientific theory?
44
) 
Philosophically, he refers with a hint of irony to Hegel‘s imprudent leap away from 
Kant – from a deliberately regulative, projective vision of organism to a ‗rational 
metaphysics‘ or, in Canguilhem‘s terms, an explicit identification of  concept and life: 
―Hegel accepted what Kant refused to accept. In the Phenomenology of Spirit as well as in 
the Jena Real-philosophie. . . the Concept and Life are identified with each other.‖45 And 
yet, at times Canguilhem appears to side with Aristotle (whom he enthusiastically describes 
as the first to understand concept and life together) and Hegel rather than with Kant and 
Goldstein ‗read in one way‘. For Goldstein, too, is double-sided on this matter – his work 
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on the concept of organism has both a constructivist side, like a Kantian regulative ideal or 
a Dennettian intentional stance and a realist side, filled with references to Goethe and 
Naturphilosophie (the organism is by essence ―historical,‖ in time rather than in space, it is 
pure activity or creativity, etc.) which fits with the Aristotle-and-Hegel side in 
Canguilhem.
46
 Canguilhem fits somewhere in between Goldstein and Darwin, or, to say it 
differently, between the metaphysics of Aristotle and Hegel and the anti-metaphysics of 
Nietzsche. Think of his typically revealing-yet-mysterious pronouncement ―Je suis un 
nietzschéen sans carte.‖47 
Scientifically, or in terms of the history of science, Canguilhem is similarly careful 
to distinguish strong metaphysical vitalism from the views (and practices) of the 
eighteenth-century vitalists, in contradistinction to people like Driesch. This is the theme of 
‗biological Newtonianism‘: 
Eighteenth-century vitalists are . . . not impenitent metaphysicians but rather 
prudent positivists, which is to say, in that period, Newtonians. Vitalism is first of 
all the rejection of all metaphysical theories of the essence of life. This why most of 
the vitalists referred to Newton as the model of a scientist concerned with 
observation and experiment. . . . Vitalism ultimately means the recognition of life 
as an original set or realm [ordre] of phenomena, and thus the recognition of the 
specificity of biological knowledge.
48
 
 
A medical vitalist in the eighteenth century is not a substantival, metaphysical vitalist of the 
late nineteenth or early twentieth century. Indeed, Canguilhem goes as far as to say that 
eighteenth-century vitalists are anti-metaphysicians opposed to the strong metaphysics of 
animism or mechanism.
49
 As Karen Detlefsen puts it in a different context, ontological 
reduction does not have to affect the ‗scientific‘ pertinence of the distinction between the 
living and the non-living.
50
 
Lastly, there is a long passage in ―Aspects du vitalisme,‖ one of the most difficult 
ones in this essay, in which Canguilhem rejects Drieschian vitalism (or mysterianism as we 
would call it today) more clearly than anywhere else: 
In sum, the classical vitalist grants that living beings belong to a physical 
environment, yet asserts that they are an exception to physical laws. This is the 
inexcusable philosophical mistake, in my view. There can be no kingdom within a 
kingdom [empire dans un empire], or else there is no kingdom at all. There can only 
be one philosophy of empire, that which rejects division and imperialism. . . . One 
cannot defend the originality of biological phenomena and by extension, of biology, 
by delimiting a zone of indeterminacy, dissidence or heresy within an overall 
physicochemical environment of motion and inertia. If we are to affirm the 
originality of the biological, it must be as a reign over the totality of experience, not 
over little islands of experience. Ultimately, classical vitalism is (paradoxically) too 
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modest, in its reluctance to universalize its conception of experience (p. 95, 
emphasis mine). 
 
‗Classical‘ vitalism as described here is what is commonly termed substantival vitalism. 
And Canguilhem‘s diagnosis of an ―inexcusable philosophical mistake‖ is clear enough. 
But what should we make then of his defense of the ―originality of the biology,‖ i.e. the 
autonomy of biology, as a ―reign over the totality of experience‖? What looks at first glance 
like metaphysical holism might instead be an ‗attitudinal‘ conception, that is, a point of 
view on experience. Indeed, even when Canguilhem discusses the uniqueness of organisms 
he never denies that their ‗holistic‘ quality is enabled by ―various regulatory processes or 
mechanisms‖ that subserve the whole and ―maintain its integrity.‖51 
 
 4. 
 Unlike the ―classical vitalist,‖ Canguilhem insists, using Spinoza‘s phrase, that we 
are not a kingdom within a kingdom, an imperium in imperio! That is, the laws of the 
physical world apply in full to all living beings, humans included, without exceptions. So 
all problems would appear to be solved. Yet this statement creates new problems! Granted, 
to the standard question, how can one be a vitalist and reject any imperium in imperio?, we 
can answer on Canguilhem‘s behalf that one can be a constructivist or heuristic vitalist; but 
what do we do then with all the talk of ‗Life itself‘, le vivant? Similarly, if we grant in 
addition that the ‗Aristotelian‘ dimension in his vitalism – the stress on how Life itself 
creates a certain attitude on the part of the knower – is not to be confused with 
mysterianism, we are left with the rather opaque invocation in the above quotation of 
―experience.‖ It doesn‘t seem to fit with the rest of his views … except if we recall that he 
is, after all, a ‗Goldsteinian‘.52 If we think back to what I called Canguilhem‘s humanism, it 
does have a dualistic quality to it, even if is a ‗functional‘ or ‗double aspect‘ dualism, of the 
knower and the known,
53
 the knower / philosopher / scientist and Life itself. 
 Indeed, in a very real sense one cannot distinguish between a historical claim and a 
philosophical claim in Canguilhem‘s ‗history of vitalism‘ or ‗vitalism‘. To put it in the 
form of a slogan (in fact a phrase which concludes the long article ―Le concept et la vie‖): 
Contemporary biology, read in a certain way, is somehow a philosophy of life.
54
 
Or, to take a particular case, recall his attitude towards the Cartesian notion of animal-
machines, as noted by Gaukroger: Canguilhem views them on the one hand as inadequate 
representations of organisms, but on the other hand, as the ruse of reason (!), as a form of 
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skill, referring back to the original term μηχανή. As such, he considers that mechanistic 
representations are subsumable once again under the category of Life and its productions, 
i.e., as modalities of the organic world.
55
 Indeed, even though Canguilhem discusses the 
rise of developmental biology at least through Hans Spemann, he never addresses the fact 
that the mechanisms of generation can ultimately be seen as just that: mechanisms; or that 
Descartes carefully avoided making specific claims about them, as he couldn‘t see them, 
which does not mean that Cartesian biology qua mechanistic biology is condemned to any 
sort of failure. Similarly, he shares with the other main figures of post-war ‗biophilosophy‘ 
a hostility to reductionist explanations in developmental biology – but in his case, without 
claiming that there is a substantive difference between the world of living organisms and 
the mechanistically specifiable world of inanimate matter (this would be the position he 
calls ‗classical vitalism‘ above); or between organismic biology and molecular biology.56 
Of course, dialectically enough, Canguilhem‘s blurring of the divide between being 
a historian-épistémologue focusing on the life sciences, and being a ‗metaphysical vitalist‘ 
can again be seen in a more positive light, i.e., in more manageable, ‗attitudinal‘ terms: one 
can argue that (a) the Aristotelian dimension, (b) that of experience, and (c) the existential 
dimension all cohere with his claim that vitalism is an ―attitude‖ (―une orientation de la 
pensée biologique‖) rather than strictly an episode (―une étape de sa démarche‖).57 And if, 
as present-day historians of science, we point out that he gives a partisan reading of 
biological thought intended to delegitimize Cartesian mechanism in favor of biological 
epigenesis – and vitalism, then why shouldn‘t we also acknowledge that present-day 
biological thought is, if not fully reversing course, at least arguing in a strongly ‗epigenetic‘ 
direction and privileging developmental biology over genetics (or at least an essentialist 
vision of genetic information)?
58
 
 Nevertheless, even if we can agree that vitalism is unlike geocentrism or phlogiston 
in the way Canguilhem suggested, and we can see the possible interest in discussing 
vitalism as an ‗attitude‘, we should also recognize that Canguilhem‘s revisionist project to 
put the life sciences at center stage in the history of science overall (which had traditionally 
been dominated by the hard sciences) is bound up with strong ontological commitments, 
and a certain conceptual vagueness to boot. Namely, his project must amount to a claim 
regarding the specificity of its object, but it is not easy to make out exactly which claim he 
wants to make: 
— Life itself as an object is ontologically unique, including in its anomalousness; 
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— living entities are meaningful and meaning-producing entities and thus have to be 
understood as such (this covers both the existential and the Goldsteinian aspects of 
his claim). 
Canguilhem‘s vagueness appears, e.g., when he denies that vitalism is a metaphysics, and 
then adds immediately afterwards that it is ―the recognition of the originality of the fact of 
life [le fait vital].‖59  
 
 
Conclusion 
I initially wanted to end with the reminder that the intellectual episode I‘ve 
presented should be viewed as an interesting ‗heuristic‘ model of vitalism which is much 
more sensible than is usually acknowledged in Anglophone philosophy of science and 
related disciplines.
60
 That is, it‘s not substantival vitalism, and if it is ‗metaphysical‘ it is 
such in a much more manageable sense. For one thing, Canguilhem‘s vitalism may differ 
from the Aristotelian-inspired ‗organicism‘ of Marjorie Grene in that it denies that there are 
any fundamental norms other than Life itself, which is a source of norms rather than being 
governed by them. Human values are no more real than anything else in the space-time 
world – this is Canguilhem‘s more ‗Spinozist‘ side: ―The term ‗real‘, in all rigor, can only 
be applied to the universe itself, the universal environment [milieu universel] of elements 
and motions as recognized by science‖; ―the environment of man‘s values isn‘t any more, 
taken in itself, than the specific environment of the woodlouse or the gray mouse.‖61 
Further, in a more descriptive vein, Canguilhem can quote Claude Bernard to the effect that 
there is nothing wrong in principle with applying physicochemical laws to vital phenomena, 
but the result will be to subsume the latter under the former, reiterating the laws of physics 
and chemistry rather than discovering the specific laws of physiology.
62
 In this sense, 
Canguilhem both does and does not fit into the category known as ‗biophilosophy‘ in 
France in the first decades after the end of the Second World War (of which Raymond 
Ruyer and Gilbert Simondon are notable figures); his historico-philosophical project, 
despite its ambiguities, appears more flexible and open-ended than these biologically 
motivated metaphysics. 
But is this understanding of vitalism that interesting? In fact, pleas for explanatory 
autonomy in biology, or the need for special theoretical tools to deal with complexity, are a 
dime a dozen today. We need look no further than a representative figure in American 
philosophy of science, William Bechtel, to find discussions of how ―organization‖ is a key 
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explanatory challenge for mechanistic, reductionist modeling, with reference to Claude 
Bernard, among others.
63
 So here, instead, is a different conclusion: looking at Canguilhem 
the ‗biophilosopher‘, the scholar of vitalism who is also a vitalist, one could say that 
interesting and indeed legitimate results in intellectual and scientific history (notably, 
totally revising our picture of the emergence of the life sciences, and the philosophical 
ramifications of that emergence) can be arrived at for the wrong reasons! – or at least, for 
philosophical reasons that we might not want to take on board. Sometimes, good money 
does follow bad. Conversely, present-day historians and philosophers of science who 
invoke Canguilhem in support of their constructivist epistemological inquiries
64
 might learn 
from the above analysis that Canguilhem is rather more metaphysically committed than 
they would like him to be. Whether this is necessarily a negative feature of his thought is 
something I leave open to discussion. 
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